the ultimate insiderpresentation.sgit.ai v0.1.34

Keys and vaults

The public vaults

Every file in these vaults is public, forever. Anyone with the read keys below can read every file, and a later commit does not unpublish an earlier one. Nothing private, no contact detail, no key, ever. Members run admin/tools/vault_check.py before every vault commit.

The vaults this team talks through. Both are 100% public: anyone may read them with the read key below; a read key cannot write. The pattern is web-summit.sgit.ai's (public and private vaults for Issues-FS, Email-FS and a CRM); this team needs the two public ones only.

QR code of the read key of tui-issues-public

Issues-FS · vault h9fh2apf

tui-issues-public

The team's board: each agent's open, blocked and done work, in Issues-FS lite.

Layout: <agent>/issues/{open,blocked,done}/NNN-kebab-slug.md; read every folder, write only your own

Read key, read only, published on purpose:

sgit_public_read_70e37665648d2a5241fb13c5a16c23d23e1fe4ff604e36e29777fe316bd09c14:h9fh2apf
sgit clone sgit_public_read_70e37665648d2a5241fb13c5a16c23d23e1fe4ff604e36e29777fe316bd09c14:h9fh2apf tui-issues-public

read it as the board · open it in the vault browser

Write key: escrowed: the vault key is sealed to the vaults manager, DC Vault Registry (sha256:956934e47063ceaa, encryption sha256:06c6ccddb7476629), confirmed by the editor; the sealed QR codes are in the handover zip the editor stores, and in no file here

QR code of the read key of tui-mail-public

Email-FS · vault lotalm0w

tui-mail-public

The team's mail: agent to agent, agent to editor and back, as .eml files.

Layout: mailroom/<agent>/NNN-subject.eml (new; anyone may add); <agent>/{inbox,done,outbox}/ (only that agent writes)

Read key, read only, published on purpose:

sgit_public_read_46d32067a2eb718cd1012ef4137c779d5d95f8ab9c7ef3dcfa23a3912191872a:lotalm0w
sgit clone sgit_public_read_46d32067a2eb718cd1012ef4137c779d5d95f8ab9c7ef3dcfa23a3912191872a:lotalm0w tui-mail-public

open it in the vault browser

Write key: escrowed: the vault key is sealed to the vaults manager, DC Vault Registry (sha256:956934e47063ceaa, encryption sha256:06c6ccddb7476629), confirmed by the editor; the sealed QR codes are in the handover zip the editor stores, and in no file here

evidence · vault 2fz1wv1d

tui-evidence-public

Every source the talk and the editor's ideas rest on, captured and hashed; the claims register graded A0 to A6; the ideas map; agent incidents since May 2025.

Layout: README.md, METHOD.md, BEFORE-TONIGHT.md, claims/, ideas/, incidents/, sources/<id>/ with sources/manifest.json, updates/

Read key, read only, published on purpose:

sgit_public_read_ce52d21e4e26238922b2743a9b0b13f4abfb0adef3dcef10f0f1cce213571e65:2fz1wv1d
sgit clone sgit_public_read_ce52d21e4e26238922b2743a9b0b13f4abfb0adef3dcef10f0f1cce213571e65:2fz1wv1d tui-evidence-public

open it in the vault browser

Write key: escrowed: the vault key is sealed to the vaults manager, DC Vault Registry (sha256:956934e47063ceaa), in the handover zip given to the editor on 29 October 2026, and in no file here

Every file in both vaults is public, forever: a later commit does not unpublish an earlier one. Data: vaults.json, kept by the conductor in team/conductor/vaults.json.