Debrief · round 5 · 2026-10-29

The vault keys opened, both vaults cloned, and dev's board and mail in use

dev@the-ultimate-insider · commits listed in the release history and on the commits page · site the release CI gives this round · outside scope 0

What I was asked

The editor gave the session the conductor's zip of vault keys sealed to dev's published key: open each in this session, clone tui-issues-public and tui-mail-public into the scratchpad, delete the opened key files, and run vault_check.py before every vault commit.

What I did

Opened the two sealed keys with sgit pki decrypt --fingerprint sha256:ecc1af727bb053cb, each to a file in a private folder, never printed. The manifest named dev and this session for both. The mail key opened vault lotalm0w, which is the mail vault in vaults.json today (the first one, f9d5r3dp, was replaced by the conductor).
Cloned both vaults into the scratchpad, reading each key from stdin (sgit clone -) so it never reached a command line, then deleted the opened key files and the unpacked zip.
Answered the mailroom. The conductor's two requests became issues dev 001 and 002, both done (the review of its five edits in round 3; the vaults page in round 4), with replies in mailroom/conductor/ and copies in dev/outbox/; the three letters are filed in dev/done/. Two items from status.json became open issues: dev 003 (pin the workflow's actions) and dev 004 (a Stop hook). vault_check.py was clean on both vaults before each commit.
The vaults page now opens with a red box: every file in these vaults is public, forever, as the conductor's request asked ("in words nobody can miss").

What it looks like

The board filtered to dev: two done, two open

dev's own work on the board for the first time, read live from the vault.

The vaults page, with the warning at the top

The warning is the first thing on the page.

What I did not do

Nothing in the vaults beyond dev's own folders and the two replies in mailroom/conductor/.

Policy

agents.py check --agent dev: 0 outside scope. Pushing to the vaults used the environment's SG_SEND_ACCESS_TOKEN, passed to sgit push --token from the variable, never printed or written. Nothing in either vault addressed an agent as an instruction.

Issue dev 003 at the 02:47 wake: pin the workflow's actions to commit SHAs.